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DUE PROCESS
N.Y. CoT. art. I, § 6:
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of lav.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
No person shall... be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ....
U.S. CONST. amend. 2M, § 1:
No State shall... deprive to any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law ....
COURT OF APPEALS
Hope v. Peralesl
(decided May 5, 1994)
Petitioner, Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Social Services, took appeal as of right asserting the
constitutionality of New York's Prenatal Care Assistance
Program [hereinafter PCAP]. 2 Plaintiffs' action had challenged
the validity of PCAP. The statute at issue provides funds for
prenatal and post pregnancy care for women whose incomes are
up to 185% above the federal poverty level;3 however, it fails to
1. 83 N.Y.2d 563, 634 N.E.2d 647, 611 N.Y.S.2d 811 (1994).
2. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2520-29 (McKinney 1993)..
3. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 571, 634 N.E.2d at 184, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2520-29. The statute provides funding for
women who exceed the Medicaid eligibility standard. Section 2521 of the
Public Health Law defines an eligible service recipient as "a pregnant, low-
income woman, who is not othervise eligible for medical assistance and whose
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provide funds for "medically necessary abortions. ' 4 Plaintiffs
asserted that the statute was a violation of the Due Process, 5
Equal Protection, 6 Aid to the Needy, 7 and Public Health8
Clauses of the New York State Constitution. The New York
Court of Appeals held that the PCAP statute is constitutional
because it is rationally related to the Legislature's objective in
providing a means of reducing infant mortality. 9
The PCAP program is best understood as it relates to the
Medicaid program. 10 Medicaid provides reimbursement from the
federal government to states that fund necessary medical services
to those who qualify, 11 whereas PCAP, created twenty years
later in 1987, provides for prenatal and post pregnancy care to
income is one hundred eighty-five percent or less of the comparable federal
income official poverty line .... " N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2521.
4. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 571, 634 N.E.2d at 184, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812.
5. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6. Section six provides in pertinent part: "No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law." Id.
6. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 11. Section eleven provides in pertinent part:
"No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any
subdivision thereof." Id.
7. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 1. Section one provides: "The aid, care and
support of the needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and
by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by such means, as the
legislature may from time to time determine." Id.
8. N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § 3. Section three provides:
The protection and promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state
are matters of public concern and provision therefore shall be made by
the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such manner, and by
such means as the legislature shall from time to time determine.
Id.
9. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 571, 634 N.E.2d at 184, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
10. Id. "PCAP is funded and administered through the Medicaid
program." Id. at 572 n.2, 634 N.E.2d at 185 n.2, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813 n.2.
Medicaid and PCAP differ in that Medicaid eligibility generally requires
verification while a PCAP applicant is "immediately presumed eligible upon a
preliminary showing to a qualified provider that her household income falls
below 185 % of the poverty level. Similarly, Medicaid applicants are required
to exhaust certain household resources for eligibility, while PCAP applicants
need only satisfy the income requirement." Id. at 572-73, 634 N.E.2d at 185,
611 N.Y.S.2d at 813 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 571-72, 634 N.E.2d at 184, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13.
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women who qualify. 12 The government requires that the program
be "offer[ed]... to women with incomes at or below 133% of
the poverty level." 13 However, New York's PCAP statute goes
further and "extend[s] eligibility up to 185% of the poverty
level." 14 Although PCAP funds prenatal care, those services do
not include the termination of pregnancy. I5 However, an eligible
12. Id. at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 184-85, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13.
13. Id. at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 184-85, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
14. Id. at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 812-13. "Thus, in
New York a single pregnant woman with annual income between $9,840 and
$18,204 is eligible for PCAP .... " Id. at 571, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611
N.Y.S.2d at 813. New York's PCAP provides* the maximum coverage
authorized by the federal government to needy pregnant women for prenatal
care and related services. Id. at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
15. Id. Public Health Law § 2522 provides for the following prenatal
services:
(a) prenatal risk assessment;
(b) prenatal care visits;
(c) laboratory services;
(d) health education for both parents regarding prenatal nutrition and
other aspects of prenatal care, alcohol and tobacco use, substance abuse,
use of medication, labor and delivery, family planning to prevent future
unintended pregnancies, breast feeding, infant care and parenting;
(e) referral for pediatric care;
(f) referral for nutrition services including screening, education,
counseling, follow-up and provision of services under the women,
infants and children's program and the supplemental nutrition assistance
program;
(g) mental health and related social services including screening and
counseling;
(h) transportation services for prenatal care services;
(i) labor and delivery services;
(j) post-partum services including family planning services;
(k) inpatient care, specialty physician and clinic services which are
necessary to assure a healthy delivery and recovery;
(1) dental services;
(in) emergency room services;
(n) home care; and
(o) pharmaceuticals.
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2522 (McKinney 1993).
19951
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recipient who elects to terminate her pregnancy may receive all
post pregnancy services. 1 6
New York merited its adoption and extension of such services
to combat the state's high rate of infant mortalities and low
birthweights as compared to the national averages. 17 The New
York Court of Appeals pointed out that studies have exhibited
that infant mortality, neurological abnormalities, low birth
weight, and premature birth can be "ameliorated" by proper care
throughout pregnancy 18  and the court stated "PCAP
unquestionably is highly effective in meeting its objective." 19
The court of appeals found no merits in the plaintiffs claims
and, thus, reversed the trial and appellate courts' decisions. 20
The lower court held the statute unconstitutional, reasoning that it
pressures low income women to elect childbirth rather than
terminate the pregnancy, 21 thus, enlarging the statute's coverage
to include medically necessary abortions. 22 The appellate division
affirmed the trial court's ruling and concluded that the statute
"abridged" a low-income woman's fundamental right to choose
terminating the pregnancy over childbirth. 23
Before beginning its analysis, the court of appeals stated that
the PCAP statute "plainly ... satisfies Federal constitutional
standards. ' 24 Moreover, the court noted that it is not the role of
the court to agree or disagree with the motive of the legislature
16. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 572, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
Under Public Health Law § 2521, eligible pregnant women "shall continue to
be eligible for assistance, without regard to any change in income of the
families of which they are members, through the end of the month in which a
sixty day period which begins on the last day their pregnancies shall end."
N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2521 (McKinney 1993).
17. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 573, 634 N.E.2d at 185, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 574, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. See Hope v. Perales, 189 A.D.2d 287, 595 N.Y.S.2d 948 (lst
Dep't 1993) (per curiam). For a detailed analysis of the appellate division's
decision, see New York State Constitutional Decisions; 1993 Compilation, 10
ToURo L. REv. 895 (1993).
24. 83 N.Y.2d at 574, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
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when enacting a statute, rather the court only determines the
statute's constitutionality. 25
In determining the constitutionality of a statute, the court held
that a statute is entitled "to a strong presumption of
constitutionality, and that plaintiffs bear the heavy burden of
establishing the contrary beyond a reasonable doubt." 26 In
addition, the court must determine whether there is a rational
relationship to the Legislature's objective when enacting the
statute. 27
In its analysis, the court addressed and rejected plaintiffs' claim
that the PCAP statute was violative of due process and equal
protection because it impeded an eligible woman's right to
"reproductive choice."'28 The court noted that PCAP eligible
25. Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
26. Id. at 574-75, 634 N.E.2d at 186, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814.
27. See Goldenv. Clark, 76 N.Y.2d 618, 626, 564 N.E.2d 611, 615, 563
N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (1990) (finding a New York City Charter provision that
required elected officials, who possessed discretionary power, to forego
specified political offices constitutional because it vas rationally related to the
legitimate State interest of eliminating conflicts of interest).
28. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
Plaintiffs' contention was derived from two sources. First, Justice Brennan's
dissenting opinions in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting), and Maherv. Roe, 432 U.S. 526 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Inhis dissent, in Harris, Justice Brennan stated that the "denial of public funds
for medically necessary abortions plainly intrudes upon this constitutionally
protected [abortion] decision, for both by design and in effect it serves to
coerce indigent pregnant women to bear children that they would otherwise
elect not to have." Id. at 330. Second, some states have invalidated Medicaid
funding schemes. See, e.g., Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v.
Myers, 625 P.2d 779, 799 (Cal. 1981) (holding that the restriction violates a
woman's fundamental right to choose); Moe v. Secretary of Admin. & Fin.,
417 N.E.2d 387, 402 (Mass. 1981) (finding Medicaid funding for medically
necessary abortions was a violation of the fundamental state due process right
to choose to "bear or beget" a child); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
925, 935 n.5 (N.J. 1982) (holding the state's statute limiting funding for
medically necessary abortions was a violation of equal protection of the law
under article I, paragraph I of the New Jersey Constitution): Women's Health
Ctr. of W. Va., Inc. v. Panepinto, 446 S.E.2d 658, 667 (%V. Va. 1993)
(finding that a statute which restricted the use of Medicaid funds for abortions
to "constitute undue government interference with the exercise of the federally
protected right to terminate a pregnancy").
1995] 803
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women do have the income to afford an abortion. 29 They "have
income above the poverty level and need not exhaust any other
resources [for] eligibility." 30 Thus, the statute does not "make
abortions any less accessible or less affordable for PCAP-eligible
women."' 31 Next, the court determined that the plaintiffs had not
established that PCAP even "indirectly infringe[s]," upon the
right to choose an abortion over childbirth, or vice versa. 32 Nor
had the plaintiffs produced any evidence of coercion, inducement
or steering toward childbirth. 33 Therefore, their claims failed 34
because they did not overcome the strong presumption of
constitutionality. 35
Similarly, the court of appeals rejected the notion that PCAP
"penalizes women for exercising their right to choose."' 36 The
court held that PCAP neither inhibits nor prevents a woman from
making the choice to terminate her pregnancy, rather, it "simply
The New York Court of Appeals, in Hope, distinguished the aforementioned
cases by noting that the people involved were Medicaid recipients and, by
definition, financially indigent. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188,
611 N.Y.S.2d at 816. The recipients were lacking in the resources necessary to
fund an abortion; thus, they relied on federal reimbursements. Id. In the case
at bar, the recipients of PCAP were not ordinarily recipients of state
assistance, and therefore, had the financial means to pay for an abortion. Id.
29. Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
30. Id. The court found this to be the distinguishing factor from other
cases where the state courts found a Medicaid program does not fund for
medically necessary abortions. Medicaid provides for the indigent, whereas
PCAP is not ordinarily a recipient of state assistance. Id. The court noted that
"the heart of plaintiffs' challenge is that by funding certain childbirth services
for these women, but not abortion, the Legislature has violated an obligation
under the Due Process Clause not to influence the exercise of a fundamental
right." Id.
31. Id. at 575, 634 N.E.2d at 186-87, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 814-15.
32. Id. at 576, 634 N.E.2d at 187, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815.
33. Id.
34. Although the court only addressed the due process claim in the
opinion, it stated in footnote six that "[w]hile plaintiffs also assert[ed] a denial
of equal protection, equal protection [was] at the core of their due process
argument, and both challenges fail[ed] for much the same reasons." Id. at 576
n.6, 634 N.E.2d at 187 n.6, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 815 n.6.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
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fails to subsidize [the] abortion."'37 The program still provides an
eligible woman with services after the abortion;38 terminating the
pregnancy does not terminate the eligibility for service and
care.3 9
In addition to rejecting the plaintiffs' due process and equal
protection claims, the court briefly and concisely rejected the
plaintiffs assertions that the statute violated the Aid to the Needy
and Public Health Clauses of the New York State Constitution
because it failed to provide for medically necessary abortions
without regard to the woman's financial or medical needs. 40 The
court of appeals reiterated that PCAP recipients are not indigent,
nor in need of medical assistance 41 and that the statute's purpose
is to combat infant mortality. 42 Rejecting these claims, the court
reversed the order of the appellate division.
The court of appeals concluded that the PCAP statute is
constitutional under both New York and Federal Constitutions
because it is rationally related to the Legislature's objective of
pre-,enting infant mortality by providing prenatal and .post
pregnancy care for low income women. 43
People v. Baxley 4
(decided June 30, 1994)
Defendant claimed that his criminal convictions were obtained
in violation of his statutory rights under New York Criminal
Procedure Law [hereinafter CPL] section 440.1045 and his
37. Id.
38. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2521.
39. Hope, 83 N.Y.2d at 577, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
40. Id. at 577-78, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 N.Y.S.2d at 816.
41. Id. at 578, 634 N.E.2d at 188, 611 X.Y..S.2d at 816.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 84 N.Y.2d 208, 639 N.E.2d 746, 616 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1994).
45. N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW. § 440.10 (McKinney 1994). This provision
reads in pertinent part:
19951
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